Looking at substance use disorders through lenses of self psychology and existential psychotherapy : a theoretical study by DiLorenzo, Michael E.
Smith ScholarWorks 
Theses, Dissertations, and Projects 
2009 
Looking at substance use disorders through lenses of self 
psychology and existential psychotherapy : a theoretical study 
Michael E. DiLorenzo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.smith.edu/theses 
 Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
DiLorenzo, Michael E., "Looking at substance use disorders through lenses of self psychology and 
existential psychotherapy : a theoretical study" (2009). Masters Thesis, Smith College, Northampton, MA. 
https://scholarworks.smith.edu/theses/1186 
This Masters Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in Theses, Dissertations, and Projects by an authorized 
administrator of Smith ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@smith.edu. 
  
Michael DiLorenzo 
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ABSTRACT 
This theoretical study explored the theoretical frameworks of self psychology and 
existential psychotherapy in the context of their usefulness for clinical social workers in 
their therapeutic work with clients with substance use disorders (SUDs). The central 
guiding question of this thesis was, “How can the theoretical lenses of self psychology 
and existential psychotherapy help clinical social workers and other mental health 
professionals to better understand SUDs and inform clinicians’ work with addicted 
clients?”  
In this theoretical study, self psychology and existential psychotherapy were 
examined and employed as a means of understanding the nature of SUDs. In addition, 
these two theories were used to analyze and interpret the underlying psychological and 
existential factors that may contribute to the development and persistence of SUDs in 
some individuals. This study concluded that both self psychology and existential 
psychotherapy can be useful—separately and even more so together—to clinicians in 
their work with clients with SUDs.  
Both of these theories, despite their many differences, share a number of 
important similarities that make them useful for clinical social work. These include an 
optimistic view of the potential for growth and healing through treatment; the importance 
of imperfect attunement and empathic failures between therapist and client during the 
  
course of therapy; an emphasis on trying to understand the client’s subjective experience; 
and a genuinely humane and respectful view of all clients, including those struggling with 
SUDs.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the latest National Survey on Drug Use and Health, it was estimated that today 
in the United States there are more than 22 million people over the age of 12 who have 
been classified as having a substance use disorder (SUD) (Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration [SAMHSA], 2008).  While many of the individuals who 
are in need of substance abuse treatment never actually receive any, SUDs remain a 
common precipitating factor for individuals who seek or are mandated for treatment at 
facilities where they are likely to encounter clinical social workers and other mental 
health clinicians. Moreover, since drug and alcohol problems are so common among 
clinical populations, every mental health clinician is, at one time or another, likely to 
have clients with SUDs in his or her caseload, whether or not an SUD was the 
“presenting problem” that led a particular client to seek treatment initially (Washton & 
Zweben, 2006). 
Given the scope of the problem, it is important for all mental health clinicians to 
be familiar with SUD symptomatology and treatment approaches that are useful when 
working with clients with SUDs. Further, it is particularly important for clinicians to be 
aware of the possible underlying or co-occurring psychological and existential factors 
that may initially lead individuals to abuse and/or become dependent on substances, and 
that contribute to the persistence of these patterns of substance abuse and dependence 
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over time. A guiding premise of this project is that both of the two selected theories—self 
psychology and existential psychotherapy—can be useful (separately and, even more so, 
together) to clinicians in their work with clients with SUDs, both as a way of 
understanding the nature of their clients’ problems and as a helpful framework on which 
to base their clinical interventions. 
The subject of SUDs has been examined extensively over a fairly long period of 
time from a variety of theoretical standpoints. A number of early psychoanalytic thinkers, 
including Freud and those that followed, began to consider and examine the phenomenon 
of addiction in the early part of the 20th Century. Many of the early psychoanalytic 
writings dealing with the subject of alcohol and drug addiction were steeped in the idea 
that problems involving innate sexual and aggressive drives were what led certain 
individuals to abuse and become dependent on alcohol or drugs (Freud, 1897; Abraham, 
1908/1926; Glover, 1932; Radó, 1933). Later writings discussed other factors and viewed 
the problem of addiction from a number of different perspectives. Some writers focused 
on the idea of substance use as an artificial means of affect-regulation (Wurmser, 1974; 
Krystal, 1978; Morgenstern and Leeds, 1993; Washton & Zweben, 2006) or an attempt at 
self-medication (Khantzian, 1985/1997; Washton and Zweben, 2006) and/or self-
regulation (Khantzian, 2007).  
Others have been critical of psychoanalytic and psychodynamic perspectives on 
addiction, including those who believe that they do not give sufficient weight to the 
impact of an individual’s social environment on his or her decision to use alcohol or 
drugs (Zinberg, 1975). Addiction has also been examined from the perspective of 
cognitive theory, which holds that certain individuals become dependent on drugs and/or 
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alcohol largely as the result of a set of dysfunctional beliefs they have about substance 
use and what it does for them (Beck, Wright, Newman, & Liese, 1993). More recently, 
some writers have called attention to brain research findings which seem to indicate that 
addiction is a chemically and biologically based brain disease (Washton & Zweben, 
2006). Others have sought to frame addiction not as a something secondary to underlying 
psychological disturbances, but rather as a separate, primary illness (Brickman, 1988). 
The central guiding question of this thesis is, “How can the theoretical lenses of 
self psychology and existential psychotherapy help clinical social workers and other 
mental health professionals to better understand SUDs and inform clinicians’ work with 
addicted clients?” In this theoretical study, self psychology and existential psychotherapy 
are examined and employed as a means of understanding the nature of SUDs. In addition, 
these two theories are used to analyze and interpret certain underlying psychological and 
existential factors that may contribute to the development and persistence of SUDs in 
some individuals.  
In this thesis the focus will be on two particular theoretical perspectives—self 
psychology and existential psychotherapy. Each of these theories has a different 
perspective regarding the nature of SUDs (and psychopathology in general). From a self 
psychology perspective, SUDs and other forms of psychopathology are the result of 
deficits—in particular, defects or weakness in the self resulting from problems and 
disruptions during early self-selfobject relationships (Kohut, 1977a); substance use is an 
attempt to make up for this deficit (Goldstein, 2001). From the point of view of 
existential psychotherapy, SUDs and other forms of psychopathology are the result of 
conflict—in this case, conflict brought about by an individual’s confrontation with certain 
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existential realities or ultimate concerns—the “givens of human existence” as Yalom 
(1980) refers to them (i.e., death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness). From an 
existential perspective, substance use is seen as a maladaptive defense against existential 
anxiety. One goal of this study is to show that these two theories need not be seen as 
incompatible with one another when it comes to the issue of understanding and treating 
SUDs. Rather it will be argued that while each on its own has something valuable to offer 
to clinicians working with addicted clients, both can also be used in conjunction with one 
other in a way that will be helpful to the therapeutic work with clients struggling with 
SUDs. 
Before proceeding, it is worth calling attention to areas of potential bias on the 
part of this writer in relation to the present study. My interest in the topic of SUDs came 
at least in part as a result of my experience working with clients in an outpatient 
substance abuse treatment program during the past year. I believe that part of the reason 
that I was drawn to the two theories that are focused on in the present study is also the 
result of this experience working with addicted clients, some of whom I worked with for 
a period of several months, during which time I came to know and respect them and their 
struggles. I believe that my choice of self psychology and existential psychotherapy as 
the two theories of focus for the purpose of this study had to do in large part with my 
belief that both of these theories, despite their many differences, share a number of 
important similarities. These include an optimistic view of the potential for growth and 
healing through treatment; an emphasis on trying to understand the client’s subjective 
experience; and what I feel is an especially humane and respectful view of all clients, 
including those struggling with SUDs. 
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CHAPTER II 
SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the reader is presented with an overview of substance use 
disorders (SUDs). In order to illustrate the ways in which clinical and popular views of 
SUDs in the US have changed over time, this chapter begins with the evolution of the 
diagnostic categories and criteria of SUDs, as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), from the time of the publishing of the first edition in 
1952 through the most recent edition, DSM-IV-TR (4th edition, text revision), published in 
2000. A description of the extent to which SUDs impact the population of the US today is 
then presented. This is accomplished by means of a brief summary of the most recently 
available numbers and demographic information regarding the prevalence of SUDs in the 
US. Following this description of the affected population, data showing the need—both 
met and unmet—for treatment among individuals with SUDs is presented. The chapter 
concludes with a review of the literature in which a variety of theoretical approaches to 
understanding the nature of SUDs are discussed and summarized. One point of focus 
throughout this review of the SUD literature will be directed toward possible underlying 
issues, as well as possible developmental or experiential factors, that might lead 
individuals with SUDs to begin and/or continue their use and abuse of drugs and alcohol. 
 
 6 
Evolving Diagnostic Categories 
In 1952, when the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) was published, SUDs were grouped under personality disorders rather 
than being separated out and defined as their own distinct diagnostic category (Saunders, 
Schuckit, Sirovatka, & Regier, 2007). Within the larger category of personality disorders, 
the DSM (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1952) defined alcoholism as “cases 
in which there is well established addiction to alcohol without recognizable underlying 
disorder” (p. 39) while drug addiction was not defined in specific terms, but was viewed 
as being “usually symptomatic of a personality disorder” (p. 39). One point worth noting 
here is the way that alcohol and drugs were treated as completely separate types of 
substances. As described in this edition of the DSM, alcoholism was not understood to be 
indicative of any other sort of psychopathology, whereas drug addiction was seen to be a 
symptom of some defect in one’s personality (APA, 1952). 
In the second edition, DSM-II, published in 1968, SUDs were again grouped 
under personality disorders and had very little in the way of specific definitions or 
diagnostic criteria. Alcoholism was described as a condition in which one’s alcohol intake 
has reached a point whereby he or she is damaging his or her physical health or personal 
or social functioning, or when consuming alcohol is actually necessary in order to reach a 
point of normal functioning. A diagnosis of drug dependence required only that the 
individual in question show evidence of habitual use or need of the drug; no mention is 
made of any impairment to one’s health or functioning being necessary in the case of 
drug dependence (APA, 1968). Here again, as with the previous edition of the DSM 
(1952), we see the way that alcohol and drugs were viewed differently. A diagnosis of 
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alcoholism required that one’s health or functioning was impaired to some degree, while 
a diagnosis of drug dependence seemed only to look at whether or not one exhibited 
habitual use or need; impairment was not considered to be a criterion (APA, 1968). 
The third edition, DSM-III, published in 1980, represented a major change in the 
way that SUDs were categorized and described. Unlike in the previous two editions, in 
DSM-III SUDs were identified as a distinct diagnostic category containing the two 
separate diagnoses of substance abuse and substance dependence, each with its own set 
of diagnostic criteria. For substance abuse, there were three criteria distinguishing abuse 
from normal use: a pattern of pathological use, impairment in social or occupational 
functioning, and duration of at least one month. The two criteria for substance 
dependence, only one of which had to be present for a diagnosis of dependence to be 
indicated—except for alcohol and cannabis dependence, which required evidence of 
social or occupational impairment as well—were tolerance and withdrawal (APA, 1980). 
Another significant change seen in this edition is the similar treatment of alcohol and 
drugs, unlike in the previous two editions where alcoholism and drug addiction, while 
grouped together under the larger category of personality disorders, were viewed quite 
differently with regard to their respective diagnostic criteria.  
Today, as defined in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV), the category of SUDs is used as an umbrella term that includes the 
two separate diagnoses of substance dependence and substance abuse (APA, 2000). In 
DSM-IV, substance dependence is viewed as a more serious condition than substance 
abuse, and an individual cannot be diagnosed with both conditions during the same time 
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period; a diagnosis of dependence would preempt an earlier diagnosis of abuse (Saunders 
et al., 2007).  
According to the definition found in DSM-IV, substance dependence refers to a 
“maladaptive pattern of substance use, leading to clinically significant impairment or 
distress” (APA, 2000, p. 199) and which is evidenced by the occurrence of any three (or 
more) of the following symptoms within a twelve month period: tolerance; withdrawal; 
taking the substance in larger amounts or over a longer period of time than originally 
intended; persistent unsuccessful attempts to cut down or stop use of the substance; 
spending a great deal of time obtaining the substance, using the substance, or recovering 
from its effects; reducing or giving up important social, occupational, and/or recreational 
activities because of substance use; continuing use of the substance despite recognizing 
that such use is causing serious psychological and/or physical problems for the user.  
Substance abuse is indicated by the occurrence of any one (or more) of the 
following symptoms within a twelve month period: failure to fulfill major obligations at 
home, school, or work because of substance use; use of the substance even in situations 
where it might be physically dangerous to do so (e.g., driving when intoxicated); legal 
problems related to substance use; continuing use of the substance despite recognizing 
that such use is causing social or interpersonal problems for the user. Substance abuse, 
unlike substance dependence, does not include tolerance, withdrawal or compulsive use 
as diagnostic criteria (APA, 2000). 
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Population 
In the latest National Survey on Drug Use and Health, the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) estimated that today in the United 
States there are 22.3 million people aged 12 and older—9% of that population—who 
have been classified as having a SUD related to their use of alcohol and/or illicit drugs. 
Of these, 3.2 million were classified with an SUD involving both alcohol and illicit 
drugs, 3.7 million were classified with an SUD involving illicit drugs only, and 15.5 
million were classified with an SUD involving alcohol only. The use of the term “illicit 
drugs” is meant here to include cannabis (e.g., marijuana, hashish); cocaine, including 
crack; heroin; hallucinogens; inhalants; and the non-medical use of prescription-type pain 
relievers, tranquilizers, stimulants, and sedatives (SAMHSA, 2008) 
Among the 22.3 million people who were classified as having an SUD in 2007, 
the rate of SUDs was about twice as high for males (12.5%) as it was for females (5.7%) 
among those aged 12 and over. However, rates were similar among males (7.7%) and 
females (7.7%) between the ages of 12 and 17. With regard to race and ethnicity, the rate 
of SUDs was lowest among Asians (4.7%) and highest among Native Americans 
(13.4%). Other reported racial/ethnic group rates included individuals reporting two or 
more races (10.8%), Hawaiians/ Pacific Islanders (9.9%), Whites (9.4%), Blacks (8.5%), 
and Hispanics (8.3%). These numbers remained similar during the years 2002 through 
2007 (SAMHSA, 2008). 
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Need for Treatment 
SAMHSA (2008) estimated that of the 22.3 million individuals aged 12 and older 
who were in need of treatment for SUDs in 2007, approximately 2.4 million (10.4% of 
those in need) received treatment at a specialty facility such as a hospital (inpatient only), 
a drug or alcohol rehabilitation facility (inpatient or outpatient), or a mental health center. 
The remaining 20.8 million people needed treatment for an SUD but did not receive 
treatment at a specialty substance abuse facility. However, some of the 22.3 million 
people who were in need of treatment did receive treatment at places other than facilities 
specializing in drug or alcohol treatment, including, emergency rooms, private doctor's 
offices, prisons/jails, and self-help groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics 
Anonymous. 
Despite the fact that many individuals who are in need of treatment do not receive 
it, SUDs remain a common precipitating factor for individuals who seek or are mandated 
for treatment at facilities where they are likely to encounter clinical social workers and 
other mental health professionals. Moreover, since drug and alcohol problems are so 
common among clinical populations, every mental health clinician is, at one time or 
another, likely to have clients with SUDs in his or her caseload (Washton & Zweben, 
2006). 
Given the scope of the problem and the large numbers of individuals who are in 
need of and/or who seek treatment as a result of SUDs, it is important for all mental 
health professionals to be familiar with SUD symptomatology and treatment options. 
Further, it is particularly important that they be aware of the possible underlying or co-
occurring psychological and existential factors that may initially lead individuals to abuse 
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and/or become dependent on substances, and/or perpetuate these patterns of substance 
abuse and dependence over time.  The following section discusses a number of 
theoretical approaches to understanding SUDs; issues of underlying psychological and 
existential factors as it has been addressed by several different authors is discussed. 
 
Understanding Substance Use Disorders: Theoretical Approaches 
Early Psychoanalytic Writings 
Psychoanalysis has been cited by one author as “the first modern discipline to 
study addiction” (Yalisove, 1997).  Much of the early psychoanalytic writings dealing 
with the subject of drug and alcohol dependence were steeped in the idea that innate 
sexual and aggressive drives are what lead some individuals to abuse and become 
dependent on drugs or alcohol (Freud, 1897; Abraham, 1908/1926; Glover, 1932; Radó, 
1933). As early as 1897, in a letter to his friend, Wilhelm Fliess, Freud (1897) wrote of 
his realization that masturbation was the “primal addiction” (p. 272) for which all other 
addictions (e.g., drug and alcohol dependence) were merely substitutes or replacements 
(Freud, 1897). This realization of Freud’s occurred at a time when he had begun to 
believe that the sexual drive was at the root of all psychic conflict and psychopathology 
(Mitchell & Black, 1995). 
In what is likely the first psychoanalytic article devoted entirely to the subject of 
addiction, Abraham (1908/1926) wrote of alcoholism as a kind of sexual perversion, one 
that interacts with the sexual instinct and which results in the removal of inhibitions and 
an increase in sexual activity. Abraham also saw a connection between drinking and 
homosexuality. He believed that in normal individuals, “the homosexual component of 
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the sexual instinct yields to sublimation” (i.e., it is contained, redirected, and released in 
the form of more socially acceptable behavior) but that in the case of the alcoholic, “the 
homosexual component-instincts … reappear in no veiled form under the influence of 
alcohol” (p. 4).  
Glover (1932) saw a connection between drug addiction and the psychoses and 
believed that aggressive drives were important in the etiology of drug addiction 
(Khantzian, 2003).  He described the defensive function of drug addiction, which he saw 
as a means of controlling aggressive impulses and a means of preventing psychotic 
reactions to situations when an individual is in a state of regression (Glover, 1932). In a 
paper in which he examined the psychodynamics of alcoholism, Knight (1937/1997) 
referred to the excessive drinking of the alcoholic as a symptom of a serious, underlying 
personality disorder. He believed that alcoholics drink in an attempt to manage their 
difficult feelings and emotions and he argued that abstinence from alcohol would not 
solve the alcoholic’s problem, but would only make the nature of the underlying 
personality disorder more apparent. 
In keeping with the themes discussed by many of his psychoanalytic colleagues, 
Radó, in his 1933 paper, The Psychoanalysis of Pharmacothymia (Drug Addiction), 
described the pleasure-seeking aspects of drug use, referring to the “stimulant and 
euphoria-producing effects” (p. 4) of drugs. However, in the same paper, Radó also 
called attention to the pain-removing qualities of certain drugs and how these drugs may 
be used by certain individuals in order to manage their emotions and alleviate psychic 
distress. He asserted that both of these aspects—the pleasure-seeking and the pain-
removing effects of drugs—are rooted in the pleasure principle and together “constitute 
 13 
what may be called the ‘pharmacogenic pleasure-effect’” (p. 4). Radó’s attention to the 
ways that individuals attempt, through their use of drugs, to alleviate distress and manage 
their emotional states moved psychoanalysis beyond a purely drive-oriented 
interpretation of addiction and toward an understanding of drug use as an individual’s 
attempt at adaptation and self-regulation (Yalisove, 1997).  
Radó’s 1933 paper has been cited by at least one author as the work that launched 
“the modern psychoanalytic understanding of addiction” (Yalisove, 1997, p. 2).  In 
addition, an earlier paper by Radó (1928) described how drugs and alcohol may serve to 
strengthen ego functions—e.g., impulse control, modulation of affect, self-esteem 
regulation (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002)—and serve to manage and regulate 
internal tension and feelings of distress. These ideas presented by Radó (1928), as well as 
some of those presented by Glover (1933) regarding the defensive functions of drug use, 
acknowledged the adaptive role of addictive substances and marked “the beginning 
influence of ego psychology on the understanding of addiction” (Yalisove, 1997, p. 2). A 
number of more recent authors have taken up the theme of SUDs as an individual’s 
attempt to shore up ego functions and manage difficult emotions. Several of these are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
Evolving Psychodynamic Perspectives 
Affect Regulation. Krystal (1978) looked closely at affective disturbances and 
described how individuals with SUDs find it difficult, or completely lack the ability, to 
clearly identify or differentiate among the various affective states they experience. 
Krystal (1978) and Washton and Zweben (2006) have argued that individuals with SUDs 
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experience an affective disturbance known as alexithymia, a condition in which emotions 
come as vague, undifferentiated sensations and individuals don’t really know what they 
are feeling at any given moment. Krystal believed that alexithymic individuals experience 
affects in a somatic fashion, so affects come over them as physical sensations rather than 
feelings. Krystal (1978) has also argued that, due to problems during early development 
which resulted in disturbed object relations, individuals with SUDs experience a great 
deal of ambivalence in their feelings toward other people. They also exhibit impairments 
in autonomous functioning, especially with regard to functions such as self-control and 
self-care. Such impairments cause individuals with SUDs to feel that they need to rely on 
something external—e.g., substances or other people—in order to take care of themselves 
and maintain a sense of stability (Krystal, 1978, as cited in Morgenstern & Leeds, 1993). 
Wurmser (1974) described drug addiction as a symptom of an underlying 
disturbance rather than an illness in and of itself. He saw the use of drugs as an effort at 
self-treatment and, echoing a number of earlier psychoanalytic thinkers, he argued that 
drugs were employed as “an artificial or surrogate defense against overwhelming affects” 
(p. 829). Wurmser also believed that there is significance to the particular drug that is 
selected by an individual, since different drugs have different effects, and drug users will 
tend eventually to settle on those substances that help them best to cope with the 
particular affects that cause them the most distress. Wurmser attributes the initiation of 
compulsive drug use in most cases to an acute narcissistic crisis, often occurring during 
adolescence and precipitated by one or more events in which an individual experiences 
intense feelings of disappointment, either toward others or toward him- or herself. In such 
a crisis, the individual is overwhelmed with difficult feelings and is unable to cope 
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without some kind of artificial defense (Wurmser, 1974). Morgenstern and Leeds (1993), 
in their discussion of the work of several contemporary psychoanalytic thinkers, assert 
that there is unanimity among all of them that affect tolerance is a key factor in the 
experience of substance abusers. Furthermore, they observe that, while there may be 
differing opinions regarding the underlying cause of substance abuse, all psychoanalytic 
thinkers agree that the abuse of drugs and alcohol is an attempt at managing or avoiding 
difficult feelings through artificial means. Instead of feelings, they argue, individuals with 
SUDs have drugs and alcohol.  
Self-Medication. Recognition of the negative impact of stigma and guilt on 
individuals with SUDs has been discussed elsewhere in the literature. Khantzian (2003) 
has been critical of what he sees as the undue emphasis that was placed on the 
pleasurable and euphoric aspects of drug use stressed by many of the early 
psychoanalytic thinkers, including Freud (1897), Abraham (1908/1926), and Radó 
(1933). Khantzian has argued that this emphasis has resulted in the stigmatization of drug 
and alcohol addiction and the perception of SUDs as a moral problem rather than a health 
problem. Khantzian (1985/1997) has proposed his self-medication hypothesis (SMH) as a 
way of understanding and explaining how it is that some individuals become dependent 
on drugs and/or alcohol. According to the SMH, addicts use substances not simply 
because they are “seeking escape, euphoria, or self-destruction” (p. 438); rather they turn 
to drugs and alcohol in an attempt to self-medicate and find relief from their psychiatric 
problems and difficult emotions. In Khantzian’s view, substance abuse is thus an attempt 
at self-repair and compensation that is ultimately unsuccessful and self-defeating. 
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Washton and Zweben (2006) have cited the SMH as providing a valuable 
perspective in clinical work with individuals with SUDs because it helps clinicians to 
understand and appreciate what the use and effects of substances mean to addicted 
individuals; it helps to shed light the role that drugs and alcohol play in these individuals’ 
lives and what they are seeking through their substance use. Khantzian (2003), like 
Wurmser (1974) and others, argues that individuals are most likely to settle eventually on 
a particular substance or combination of substances, the effects of which seem to help 
them most with their particular type of distress. For example, individuals who struggle 
with feelings of anger and rage are often attracted to heroin and other opiates, while those 
who frequently feel depressed or lethargic often come to prefer the effects of stimulants 
such as cocaine or amphetamines (Khantzian, 2007). Khantzian (2007) has stressed the 
importance of understanding SUDs as a “self-regulation disorder,” (p. 8) resulting from 
problems and failures during development that result in deficits and leave some 
individuals unable to care for themselves properly. 
Self Psychology. Weegman (2002), in his examination of SUDs from a self 
psychology perspective, argues that “extensive damage to the self” (p. 49) is present in 
some individuals long before they become addicted to drugs. He does not, however, focus 
on SUDs as just an outcome of this earlier damage, arguing that clinicians don’t have to 
feel forced into making this determination in order to effectively engage with and treat 
individuals with SUDs. Rather, he stresses the need to focus on the present and to 
appreciate the continuous “tragic interaction” (p. 49) between the damage and the 
addiction, the result of which is a destructive and self-perpetuating spiral. 
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Kohut (1977a) sees in the addicted individual “a central weakness … in the core 
of his personality [and] a defect in the self” (p. vii). In his view, substance abuse is an 
attempt—one that will ultimately be unsuccessful—to somehow alleviate the distress 
caused by this defect. In Kohut’s self psychology, selfobjects are objects outside of the 
self “that give the self what it needs in order to become and remain energetic and 
cohesive” (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002, p. 181). While it is true that selfobjects are 
most often other people, they can also be things, some common examples of which are 
music, literature, and art. Kohut (1977a) argued that, for an individual with an SUD, the 
substance becomes a substitute for a selfobject that failed the individual traumatically at 
some point earlier in his or her development. Kohut saw ingestion of a drug as an attempt 
to fulfill needs that were not previously met as they should have been by an individual’s 
selfobjects. Goldstein (2001) describes the addicted individual as one who has an 
increased vulnerability to using substances because of a lack of proper internal self 
structures; substance use is an attempt to make up for this deficit.   
Criticism of Psychodynamic Approaches.  Zinberg (1975) has argued that most 
psychoanalytic thinkers have not paid enough attention to the importance of the social 
environment when examining the motivation for a particular individual to use illicit 
drugs. He asserts that “drug, set, and setting” (p. 567) all must be taken into account in 
order to reach such an understanding. He is also somewhat dismissive of the tendency, as 
he sees it, to attribute SUDs to individuals with particular personality types and 
unresolved conflicts from early in their development. Zinberg claims that such attribution 
“is based on retrospective falsification” (p. 568); he believes that one cannot assume that 
a drug-addicted individual’s attitude and personality are necessarily the same as they 
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were before the addiction began. He argues that most psychoanalytic thinkers make just 
such an assumption—they observe the addicted individual in the present and then try to 
show that his or her drug addiction was the inevitable result of a long-term process 
involving developmental problems and disruptions in early relationships (Zinberg, 1975). 
 
The Disease Concept of Addiction 
Brickman (1988) has echoed some of the ideas presented by Zinberg (1975), 
specifically with regard to the idea of a psychoanalytic interpretation of drug abuse being 
essentially retrospective. Brickman has argued that it is often not possible for the 
psychoanalytic observer to determine with certainty any cause and effect relationship in 
cases of drug and alcohol addiction when considering the psychopathology of an 
individual with an SUD. Brickman discounts the idea that SUDs are necessarily 
secondary to underlying psychological disturbances and is dismissive of the belief that 
psychoanalytic insight offers any real hope of success in the treatment of SUDs. 
Brickman believes it is important to view substance abuse/dependence as a separate, 
primary illness, one that would require a “direct, nonpsychoanalytic intervention strategy 
leading to total chemical abstinence if analysis is to succeed” (p. 360). In order to add 
weight to his argument against the idea that SUDs are secondary to underlying 
psychopathology, he observed that one could see “the entire spectrum of 
psychopathology as a result of drug and alcohol intoxication” (p. 363) and he points to 
examples such as depression, anxiety, psychosis, and suicidal ideation. Similarly, 
Vaillant (1983), asserts that most of the psychopathological symptoms exhibited by 
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alcoholics, are actually the result, rather than the cause, of alcohol abuse—i.e., 
“alcoholism is the horse, not the cart, of mental illness” (p. 317). 
Washton and Zweben (2006) observed that there is a growing body of evidence in 
the literature that points toward the conclusion that addiction is a chemically and 
biologically based brain disease. They discuss the existence of certain predisposing 
characteristics—e.g., an endorphin deficiency—that may make one individual more 
prone to developing an SUD than another individual who is not predisposed in such a 
way. Furthermore, they go on to describe the way that the continued use of drugs and/or 
alcohol by individuals who are biologically predisposed to developing an SUD can alter 
the chemistry of the brain in such a way that it is unable to return to its normal state, even 
after use has stopped. This, according to the authors, leaves such individuals forever at an 
increased risk for relapse and uncontrolled substance use. The authors assert that the 
disease concept, first proposed by Jellinek in a 1960 paper on alcoholism, has been well 
supported by recent research into the workings of the human brain. They also argue that 
the disease concept of addiction is especially useful in clinical work because it helps to 
reduce stigma and lessen a treatment-seeking individual’s feelings of shame and guilt that 
might otherwise interfere with treatment (Washton & Zweben, 2006). 
Flores (2004), writing from the disease perspective, states that addiction should 
not be viewed as “a symptom of a more serious core issue” (p. 15). Rather, it should be 
treated as a primary condition that must be dealt with directly and immediately. Flores 
asserts, as others writing from the disease perspective have done, that total abstinence 
from all substances should be seen as the most important and immediate goal of 
treatment. At the root of this emphasis lies the belief that individuals with SUDs will not 
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be able to benefit from psychotherapy as long as they are still actively using drugs or 
alcohol. Moreover, Flores (2004), like Washton and Zweben (2006), cites recent research 
involving brain imagery that shows evidence of chemical changes that can occur in the 
brain of an individual who uses drugs and/or alcohol in large enough quantities and over 
a long enough period of time. Such changes, Flores writes, involve permanent alterations 
to one’s neurophysiology and brain functioning (Flores, 2004). 
 
Cognitive Theory 
Viewing SUDs from a cognitive perspective, Beck, Wright, Newman, and Liese 
(1993) have argued that one of the major reasons that certain individuals become 
dependent on drugs and/or alcohol is because of a set of dysfunctional beliefs they have 
about substance use and what it does for them. These addictive beliefs, as the authors 
refer to them, stem from “a cluster of ideas centering around pleasure seeking, problem 
solving, relief, and escape, [as well as] justification, risk taking, and entitlement” (p. 38). 
As with many other theoretical approaches, in the cognitive model of addiction, the role 
of an individual’s emotional reactions to internal and external stimuli are acknowledged 
as being an important factor in his/her substance use. Beck et al. (1993) observe that 
addictive beliefs are exhibited by individuals only after they have become dependent on 
drugs or alcohol, and should not be seen as having caused or predisposed them to their 
addiction. However, once an individual has become addicted, these addictive beliefs do 
serve to perpetuate the addiction and place these individuals at increased and constant 
risk of relapse. With regard to the issue of what might predispose some individuals to 
develop SUDs, the authors assert that there are certain characteristics that may be evident 
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in certain individuals even before their drug use began. These could include, among 
others, a heightened sensitivity to unpleasant feelings, poor coping skills, a tendency to 
act on sudden impulses without considering consequences, and low tolerance for feelings 
of boredom and/or frustration (Beck et al., 1993). 
 
Existential Psychotherapy 
Frankl (1967, as cited in Nicholson et al., 1994) has argued that individuals could 
develop SUDs because they lack meaning in their lives. If one views the problem of 
SUDs through the lens of logotherapy, Frankl’s particular model of existential 
psychotherapy, one might see drug addiction or alcoholism as being rooted in an 
individual’s belief that his/her life is meaningless. Frankl believed that the search for 
meaning and purpose was the proper and ultimate drive of all human beings; he referred 
to this human characteristic as the “will to meaning” (Frankl, 1959, p. 121). He argued 
that if this quest was somehow blocked or disrupted the result will be a sort of existential 
vacuum in which the affected individual’s life will become devoid of meaning. The use 
of drugs and alcohol can thus be viewed as an attempt to fill this existential vacuum 
(Frankl, 1967, as cited in Nicholson et al., 1994). Hull (1987) too acknowledges the 
importance of meaning and argues that if individuals are able to commit to some sort of 
positive purpose in their lives, they will be better able to manage stress and deal with 
difficult situations and feelings. Moreover, with regard to those individuals who have 
ceased their substance use and are now in recovery, he identifies the ability to establish a 
sense of meaning and purpose in life as a key component of relapse management (Hull, 
1987). 
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Binswanger (1944/1958a), one of the earliest and most influential thinkers in the 
field of existential psychotherapy, describes toxicomania (i.e., addiction) as a case in 
which one sees a “striking case of universal existential craving to which the ‘decision-
inhibited’ man falls prey” (p. 347). In his discussion of the experience of an addicted 
individual attempting to fulfill this existential craving, Binswanger describes a sort of 
self-perpetuating cycle in which individuals attempt to fill the emptiness they feel and 
achieve enjoyment or pleasure by using drugs but then encounter shame and 
disappointment when they are struck by the unreality of their experience. Such negative 
feelings then compel these addicted individuals to repeat their substance use in yet 
another attempt to escape or feel something more positive (Binswanger, 1944/1958a).  
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CHAPTER III 
SELF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter begins by providing some of the historical context and background 
on Heinz Kohut and the development of self psychology. This chapter also introduces a 
number of key terms and major concepts of self psychology, including selfobjects and 
selfobject needs; Kohut’s concept of the tripolar self, consisting of the grandiose self, the 
idealized parent imago, and the alter ego or twinship pole; and the process of 
transmuting internalization. In addition, this chapter includes a brief discussion of the 
ways in which these key concepts and terms are relevant to an understanding of 
psychopathology from a self psychology perspective.  
On a brief explanatory note, the term “selfobject”—which is used frequently in 
this chapter—has been written in different ways throughout the relevant literature, so in 
some quotations used here it is written as “selfobject,” while in others it is written as 
“self-object.” Indeed, Kohut himself, in his earlier writings, used the hyphenated form, 
but in later writings used the single, non-hyphenated form. I follow Kohut’s later writings 
and the writings of several other authors and use “selfobject” in my own writing.  
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History 
Heinz Kohut 
Heinz Kohut (1913-1989)—doctor, psychoanalyst, and founder of self 
psychology—was born into a middle-class Jewish family in Vienna in 1913 and raised by 
his mother and father. In 1932, at the age of nineteen, Kohut entered the University of 
Vienna and enrolled in the medical faculty. He graduated with his medical degree and a 
specialization in neurology in 1938 at the age of twenty-five. Nearing the end of his time 
as a student, Kohut sought psychotherapeutic treatment with a handful of psychologists 
and psychoanalysts in order to deal with the emptiness and grief he experienced due to 
the loss of his father in 1937 (Strozier, 2001).  These experiences with his own therapy—
not all of which were pleasant or successful—and with the loss of his father seem to have 
contributed to Kohut’s growing interest in the field of psychotherapy. One biographer 
observes that "Kohut's decisive move toward the world of psychotherapy was impelled 
by the death of his father" (Strozier, 2001, p. 49). In 1940 Kohut made his way to the 
United States and settled in Chicago, where he began working as a physician, 
specializing in neurology. Over the next several years, Kohut gradually moved away 
from medicine, toward psychiatry, and then into psychoanalysis, eventually becoming 
deeply involved with the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, where he received his 
formal psychoanalytic training and went on to become a supervising and training analyst 
and a member of the teaching faculty (Strozier, 2001; Siegel, 1996).  
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Development of Self Psychology 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, most of Kohut’s energy and work was directed 
toward the theory and practice of classical psychoanalysis. He became increasingly 
interested in those patients who presented with what was generally understood to be an 
excessive an unhealthy amount of narcissism. From the point of view of classical 
psychoanalysis, such patients were considered to be unanalyzable due to their excessive 
self-absorption, a quality that would preclude the establishment of a transference within 
the therapeutic relationship (Mitchell & Black, 1995). Since Freud viewed the ability to 
develop a transference—i.e., the experience in which a patient brings into the therapeutic 
relationship feelings based on experiences in past relationships (Berzoff, Flanagan, & 
Hertz, 2002)—as a necessary requirement for the analytic process, patients with whom 
this was not possible were generally considered to be poor candidates for psychoanalysis 
(Mitchell & Black, 1995).  
From the perspective of Freud’s (1914) drive theory, every person has a finite 
amount of libidinal energy or libido and so whatever portion of it is directed outward, 
toward objects—usually people—then that much less is available for directing inward, 
toward one’s self (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002). Thus it follows from this model 
that self-love and object-love are mutually exclusive and, in a sense, in a zero-sum game 
with one other with regard to the available reservoir of libidinal energy; an increase in 
one requires a decrease in the other. 
Freud believed that all infants are completely self-absorbed and that all of their 
libidinal energy is directed inward in the form of self-love. He considered this total self-
absorption to be normal in the case of infants and viewed it as the natural starting point of 
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human development (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002). This infantile form of self-love 
was labeled by Freud as primary narcissism and was meant to be distinguished from 
secondary narcissism, the latter being “a return of the original early infantile 
[narcissism]” (Freud, 1917, p. 424). According to Freud, in the course of normal 
development, individuals move away from the totally inwardly focused self-love of the 
infant and toward a stage where they begin to direct their libidinal energy outward and to 
focus it on external objects (i.e., other people). Secondary narcissism was understood by 
Freud to be a pathological state occurring later in life—often due to trauma, illness, or old 
age—in which an individual begins to withdraw libidinal energy from objects and direct 
it inward and back toward the self (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002).  
Largely as a result of his work with patients considered to have narcissistic 
character disorders, Kohut came to question the validity and the effectiveness of the 
classical psychoanalytic approach to working with such patients. In his 1914 essay, On 
Narcissism: An Introduction, Freud had written that the “libido that has been withdrawn 
from the external world has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude 
which may be called narcissism” (p. 75). Kohut rejected this premise that there must be a 
negative correlation between self-love and love of others, and his own ideas on the topic 
of narcissism led him to a drastic reformulation of Freud’s theory. In contrast to the 
traditionally pejorative connotation that went along with the term narcissism, Kohut came 
to the conclusion that a healthy amount of love for, and good feeling about oneself—i.e., 
an optimal degree of healthy narcissism—could actually be beneficial, and was even 
quite necessary in one’s pursuit of healthy and fulfilling relationships with others. He 
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believed that it would lead to a sense of “internal solidarity and vitality [and] self-esteem 
that is reliable in the face of disappointments” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 158).  
In his work with narcissistic patients, Kohut had also come to believe that the 
classical approach—one in which interpretation, confrontation, and insight were seen as 
the key tools that would lead to a “cure”—was misguided and based on incorrect 
assumptions about the nature of these patients’ problems. Rather than going along with 
the widely accepted view of narcissistic patients as being securely and confidently self-
satisfied, Kohut came to see these individuals as “quite fragile, tending to plummet 
precipitously from a sense of soaring superiority to a clumsy crash landing on earth” 
(Mitchell & Black,  1995, p. 155). In his work with narcissistic patients, Kohut had often 
witnessed that beneath the outer surface layer of narcissism, these patients had deep 
feelings of inadequacy and personalities rooted in painful past experiences with 
humiliation. Furthermore, despite his background in classical psychoanalysis and his 
onetime label of “Mr. Psychoanalysis” (Strozier, 2001, p. xiii) during his early analytic 
career in Chicago, Kohut eventually came to reject Freud’s model of psychological 
structure as being comprised of the id, ego, and superego. Nor did Kohut accept the 
classical view that working through problems caused by intrapsychic conflict was the 
way to psychological well-being and health. Instead, Kohut believed that a healthy self is 
“derived from experiences in which caregiving others, known as selfobjects, meet the 
specific needs of the emerging self” (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002, p. 176).  In 
contrast with the classical psychoanalytic view based in Freud’s work, Kohut viewed 
aggression and rage not as innate but as reactions resulting from frustration at not having 
one’s needs met by an empathically attuned caregiver. 
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Initially, Kohut believed the new insights he developed were applicable only to 
his understanding of, and his work with, individuals with narcissistic personality 
problems. However, Kohut (1984) eventually came to believe that flaws in the self—i.e., 
“defects in the structure of the self, … distortions of the self, … [or] weakness of the 
self” (p. 53)—were at the root of all psychopathology and that such flaws are the result of  
disruptions in the relationship between self and selfobjects during childhood. Selfobjects, 
according to Kohut, are objects (usually people) outside of the self “that give the self 
what it needs in order to become and remain energetic and cohesive” (Berzoff, Flanagan, 
& Hertz, 2002, p. 181). Kohut believed that the formation of a cohesive self was at the 
core of healthy psychological development for every individual. Some of self 
psychology’s major concepts, including selfobjects and the notion of a cohesive self, will 
be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter. 
 
Key Concepts 
The Self 
Kohut (1977b) referred to the self as “the center of the individual’s psychological 
universe” (p. 311) and he regarded it as “the center of initiative of the person that 
organizes experiences and regulates self-esteem” (Goldstein, 2001, p. 80). Kohut also 
asserted that it is not possible to know, with any certainty, anything about the precise 
nature of the self, beyond that which we can perceive by observing its psychological 
manifestations. His assertion was that “the self”—its true essence—is not perceivable 
through direct observation and therefore one cannot differentiate between ‘self’ and ‘self 
representation,’ since the representation is all that can be observed (Kohut, 1977b). Kohut 
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believed that the self is present at birth in a very basic form and that it evolves as a result 
of interactions with and empathic responses from selfobjects that it encounters during its 
development. Kohut stressed the importance of an “empathic matrix of relationships that 
offer a combination of optimal empathic responsiveness and manageable empathic 
failure” (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002, p. 174) for the development of a healthy and 
cohesive self.   
Kohut believed that the self was comprised of three distinct poles—the grandiose 
self, the idealized parent imago, and the alter ego or twinship pole—each with its own 
particular selfobject needs. In his earlier writings, Kohut identified only two poles of the 
self and thus referred to the self as “bipolar.” In this original conception, he identified the 
pole of the grandiose self, the pole of the idealized parent imago, and “an intermediate 
area of basic talents and skills … activated by a tension-arc that establishes itself between 
ambitions [of the grandiose self] and ideals [of the idealized parent imago]” (Wolf, 1988, 
p. 31). However, in his later writings, Kohut (1984) spoke of the alter ego or twinship 
pole as being equal in importance to the other two poles, one with its own unique 
qualities and selfobject needs. Kohut believed that in order for healthy, normal 
development to occur, each of the three poles of this tripolar self requires selfobjects that 
empathically respond to its developmental needs (Kohut, 1977b; Berzoff, Flanagan, & 
Hertz, 2002).  
 
Selfobjects 
When one looks at the world through a self psychological lens, the importance of 
the role played by selfobjects in an individual’s development cannot be overstated. 
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Indeed, Kohut believed that the quality of the interactions between self and selfobjects 
during childhood is what determines whether the self that emerges will be healthy or 
damaged (Kohut & Wolf, 1978). Within the framework of self psychology, selfobjects 
are likened to oxygen with regard to their importance for a child’s healthy development 
(Kohut, 1977b). Early selfobjects can be described as “empathic or attuned caretakers 
who perform vital functions [that the infant] cannot carry out for itself” (Goldstein, 2001, 
p. 80). One example that is often used to illustrate this point is that of a caregiver who 
acts to soothe the infant who has not yet reached the point where it has acquired the 
ability to soothe itself in times of distress. The crucial role of caregivers is emphasized 
often by Kohut and his ultimate message seems not so much to be about specific actions 
that must be taken, but rather about the caregivers own selves as it were. He asserts that 
“it is not so much what the parents do … but what the parents are” (Kohut & Wolf, 1978, 
p. 417) that is the real influence on the child’s developing self and personality. If the 
parents are confident, flexible, and self-aware, and if their own selves are cohesive and 
healthy, then their child’s development is likely to be healthy as well.  
As important as selfobjects’ empathically attuned responses to the needs of the 
self are, Kohut held that certain non-traumatic empathic failures were inevitable and just 
as important for healthy development, and part of a necessary two-step process in which 
“first, a basic intuneness must exist between self and its selfobjects [and] second, self-
object failures (e.g., responses based on faulty empathy) of a non-traumatic degree must 
occur” (Kohut, 1984, p. 70). Such failures lead to what Kohut referred to as optimal 
frustrations—and which some others have preferred to re-label as optimal 
responsiveness—which are a necessary part of psychological growth and personality 
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development. These optimal frustrations lead in turn to the process Kohut labeled 
transmuting internalization, whereby the self takes over functions previously fulfilled by 
its selfobjects, thus reducing the importance of, or eliminating altogether the need for, the 
presence of the selfobject (Goldstein, 2001). Transmuting internalization can be defined 
as “the process through which a function formerly performed by another (selfobject) is 
taken into the self through optimal mirroring, interaction, and frustration” (Elson, 1986, 
p. 252).  
It is important to note that while Kohut often emphasized the importance of early 
interactions between self and selfobjects for healthy development, he believed that an 
individual never outgrows the need for selfobjects. Indeed, he felt that “self-selfobject 
relationships form the essence of psychological life from birth to death” (Kohut, 1984, p. 
47) and that “the need for others to provide support and sustenance continues all through 
life” (Goldstein, 2001, p. 81). Self psychology rejects the idea that complete autonomy 
and independence are good indicators of psychological and emotional health; rather it 
views an individual’s capacity to seek out gratifying selfobject experiences and establish 
rewarding relationships with other people as the true sign of a healthy person (Goldstein, 
2001). 
 
Selfobject Needs 
As mentioned earlier, Kohut believed that each of the three distinct poles of the 
self—the grandiose self, the idealized parent imago, and the alter ego or twinship pole—
has its own particular selfobject needs. The pole of the grandiose self, for example, 
requires mirroring selfobjects, “people who will reflect and identify its unique capacities, 
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talents, and characteristics” (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002, p. 181). Mirroring 
responds to the needs of the grandiose self and allows the developing child to feel 
admired, powerful, and special (Goldstein, 2001).  
The pole of the idealized parent imago, which is the part of the self that holds an 
internalized representation of an idealized other, needs selfobjects that can be viewed by 
the self as special and competent so that the self can “have someone strong and calm to 
idealize and merge with in order to feel safe and complete within the self” (Berzoff, 
Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002, pp. 185-186).  Such merger allows the establishment of the 
calmness and competence of the selfobject within the self. This in turn allows the 
individual to feel secure and soothed at times or at a stage of development when he or she 
is not capable of soothing him- or herself.  
The alter ego or twinship pole needs selfobjects that allow the self to feel that 
there are others in the world to whom it is similar and with whom it shares 
characteristics. This allows the self not to feel too different or isolated from others and 
encourages a feeling within the self that it belongs in the world. It provides the self with a 
sense of connectedness and kinship with others in the world. 
Kohut believed that these selfobject needs—mirroring, idealizing, and twinship—
are present throughout one’s lifespan. These needs, however, manifest themselves in 
different ways depending on the age and life-stage of the individual, and self 
psychologists describe age-appropriate selfobject needs as those which are normally 
required at certain ages in order to maintain an individual’s self-cohesion and sense of 
well-being (Wolf, 1988). In the case of very young children—newborns, infants, and 
toddlers—mirroring and idealizing selfobject needs must be fulfilled in order to allow 
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them to build the internal self structure that allows them to develop a sense of their own 
individuality and selfhood.  
During the Oedipal phase, selfobject needs center around the child’s need to 
strengthen self structure and develop a gender identity, which is accomplished by the 
parents responding to the child’s need for confirmation of his or her autonomy and 
maleness or femaleness. In later stages, from latency through adolescence and early 
adulthood, selfobject needs continue, but there is a gradual shifting away from the child’s 
focus on his or her parents as the fulfillers of those needs; peers, teachers, and elements 
of age-group subcultures become sources of selfobject need fulfillment (Wolf, 1988). 
Selfobject needs continue through adulthood and throughout the various life stages and 
changing roles that come with the passage of time. Marriage, parenthood, middle-age, 
and old-age all bring with them their own types of age-appropriate selfobject needs, and 
the meeting of these needs continues to be important to the maintenance of a healthy, 
cohesive self for as long as one’s life continues. 
 
Psychopathology 
As discussed previously, Kohut believed that psychopathology, in all its forms, 
had as its source flaws in the self, all of which are due to disruptions in the relationship 
between self and selfobjects during childhood (Kohut, 1984). Kohut felt that serious 
disorders of the self come about as a result of a “child’s protracted exposure to a lack of 
parental empathy in at least two areas of selfobject need” (Elson, 1986, p. 50), e.g., a lack 
of sufficient mirroring and the absence of a suitable twin or alter ego. When selfobjects 
fail a child—and his or her developing self—to such a degree, the critical process of 
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transmuting internalization cannot occur, and thus the self is unable to properly develop 
its own internal structures (Goldstein, 2001). From the perspective of self psychology, 
what is most necessary for healthy development is the presence of empathically attuned 
caregivers, ones who can serve as “mature, cohesive, parental [selves who are] in tune 
with the changing needs of the child” (Kohut & Wolf, 1978, p. 417).  
Kohut and Wolf (1978) classified self disorders into two different groups: primary 
and secondary disturbances of the self. Secondary disturbances of the self are understood 
to be normal reactions to a variety of circumstances that may be encountered during the 
life course, including loss, illness, injury, and failure. Such circumstances are seen as 
unavoidable and secondary disturbances of the self are described as non-pathological, 
temporary reactions of an undamaged self to the often unfortunate vicissitudes of life 
(Goldstein, 2001; Elson, 1986).  
Kohut and Wolf (1978) divide the primary disturbances of the self into 
subgroups, based on the severity and nature of the disturbance. These subgroups include 
narcissistic personality and behavior disorders, borderline states, and psychoses. Kohut 
believed that all of these conditions were related, but he viewed borderline states and 
psychoses, which are characterized by serious damage to the self that is permanent or 
prolonged, as much more severe than the narcissistic disorders (Goldstein, 2001). The 
primary distinction between borderline states and psychoses is that in the case of 
borderline states one often sees an individual who is comparatively high functioning and 
whose defects are often covered by a series of complex and rigid defenses. Also, in the 
case of psychoses, there is often a biological predisposition present that contributed to the 
extent of the damage that was done to the self (Goldstein, 2001; Wolf, 1988). 
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Narcissistic personality disorders and narcissistic behavior disorders differ 
primarily, as their names suggest, in the way that their symptoms manifest—i.e., in 
psychological states in the case of the former; in actions and interactions in the case of 
the latter. With narcissistic personality disorders, one often sees individuals who are 
prone to hypochondria, depression, and hypersensitivity to slights and disappointments. 
Individuals with narcissistic behavior disorders often engage in behavior that is harmful 
to themselves or others, including substance abuse, compulsive sexual behavior, and 
criminal behavior (Kohut & Wolf, 1978; Wolf, 1988; Goldstein, 2001). Both types of 
narcissistic disorder involve “the break-up, enfeeblement or serious distortion of the self” 
(Kohut & Wolf, 1978, p. 416) and both are seen as being temporary and amenable to 
psychotherapeutic treatment.  
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CHAPTER IV 
EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter begins by providing some of the historical context and background 
regarding the development of existential psychotherapy. This chapter also introduces a 
number of key terms and major concepts of existential psychotherapy, including 
existential psychodynamics; the four “ultimate concerns” (Yalom, 1980, p. 8) of human 
existence (i.e., death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness); boundary situations; and 
existential anxiety. In addition, this chapter includes a brief discussion regarding some of 
the ways in which these key concepts and terms are relevant to an understanding of 
psychopathology from an existential psychotherapy perspective.  
Before proceeding, I would like to provide the reader with a minor point of 
clarification regarding my use of certain terms throughout this chapter. I have elected to 
use the term existential psychotherapy to refer to my topic of focus. This is the term used 
by Yalom (1980) and several other authors and is meant to serve, for my purposes, as an 
umbrella term encompassing a number of different but related approaches to 
psychiatry/analysis/psychotherapy. In referring to the works of some of these other 
authors, I may use different terms in order to refer to a specific analytic approach or 
school of thought, especially when quoting directly from authors’ works or when 
discussing some of the historical background and context for the development of 
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existential psychotherapy. Other such terms that may be encountered throughout this 
chapter include existential analysis, Daseinsanalysis, logotherapy, and existential 
therapy. While there are some differences and distinct areas of emphasis among some of 
these approaches, they all share a number of elements in common and can, I believe, 
safely be included within the fold of existential psychotherapy for the purposes of this 
project. 
 
History and Context 
Existential Philosophy 
While a comprehensive discussion of the history, themes, major figures, and 
influence of existential philosophy is beyond the scope of this paper, a few brief 
statements regarding the term might be helpful. Ellenberger (1958) defines existential 
philosophy as “the philosophical trend of thought which takes as its focus of interest the 
consideration of man’s most immediate experience, his own existence” (p. 117). 
Ellenberger acknowledges that existential themes have been taken up by philosophers 
and theologians “from time immemorial” (p. 117), but identifies the nineteenth century 
Danish philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard as the first person to state explicitly its basic 
assumptions. Kierkegaard’s thoughts and writings can be seen as a reaction to, or a 
protest against the rationalism that permeated much of the scientific and philosophical 
thinking of his time. He felt that the assertion that there was some sort of knowable 
abstract, universal truth was a fallacy. Kierkegaard believed that one could know with 
certainty only that which was “true” or “real” for oneself. He asserted that truth exists for 
each individual only insofar as that individual produces it by means of his or her actions; 
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thus there are as many “truths” as there are individuals (May, 1958). Ellenberger notes 
that other thinkers since Kierkegaard have focused and elaborated on existential themes 
during the twentieth century, and he cites Karl Jaspers, Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin 
Heidegger, and Paul Tillich as among the most influential of these.  
With regard to existentialist philosophy’s relationship to psychiatry and 
psychology, Ellenberger identifies the work of Martin Heidegger, specifically citing 
Heidegger’s book Being and Time, published in 1927, as having the most direct 
influence. This is especially true in the case of Binswanger’s (1958b) development of his 
own form of existential analysis which he called Daseinsanalysis, which he based almost 
exclusively on the thought and writings of Heidegger. May (1958) writes that the 
“existentialists are centrally concerned with rediscovering the living person amid the 
compartmentalization and dehumanization of modern culture” (p. 14). In a similar vein, 
Cooper (2003) frames existential philosophy as a reaction to modes of scientific and 
philosophical thinking that take a reductionist and mechanistic view of human existence. 
 
Development of Existential Psychotherapy 
Origins. Existential psychotherapy has no single authoritative source or founder; 
nor can it be said to have arisen at one particular time and place. Rather, it emerged 
spontaneously and simultaneously in the works of several psychiatrists, psychologists, 
and psychotherapists throughout Western Europe—and subsequently in the United 
States—during the first half of the twentieth century (May & Yalom, 2000; Cooper, 
2003). This emergence was due, in large part, to what was seen by many of the early 
existentialists as an overemphasis on rationalism and scientific modes of thinking, 
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especially as they had been applied to the understanding of human thought, emotion, and 
behavior. Many of these early existential therapists felt that other psychotherapeutic 
approaches of the day—e.g., Freudian psychoanalysis, behaviorism, Jungian 
psychology—had made “man” into something of an abstraction and had, in a sense, lost 
sight of the actual person to whom these theories and therapies were being applied; they 
seemed to ignore subjective human experience (Bauman & Waldo, 1998; May & Yalom, 
2000).  
The work of a number of early existential therapists and theorists, including 
Heidegger, Binswanger, Boss, May, Frankl, and others, is often framed primarily as a 
reaction to, and a rejection of, many of the tenets of Freud’s (1923) approach to 
psychoanalysis, in particular Freud’s concept of the human individual as one governed by 
instincts and drives. The existentialists saw the Freudian conception of the human 
condition as one in which the actual living, vital, immediate, and existing person had 
been lost sight of (May & Yalom, 2000).  
Daseinsanalysis. Ludwig Binswanger, a Swiss psychiatrist and a close friend and 
associate of Freud, developed his own existential approach to psychoanalysis that he 
termed Daseinsanalyse (or Daseinsanalysis or existential analysis). The name comes from 
Heidegger’s term, dasein, translated as “being there,” which Heidegger used to refer to 
the human individual, since human beings are defined primarily by the fact that they 
exist, that they inhabit the world (Binswanger, 1958b). It is also important to note that, 
similar to Kierkegaard, Binswanger used the term “dasein” in order to emphasize the fact 
that each human being, though he or she exists and is “there” (“da”) in the world, at the 
same time creates the world that he or she inhabits (Yalom, 1980). Binswanger described 
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Daseinsanalysis, which was one of the earliest attempts to develop an existential 
approach to therapy (Cooper, 2003), as “an anthropological type of scientific 
investigation—that is, one which is aimed at the essence of being human” (Binswanger, 
1958b, p. 191).  
Binswanger found fault with Freud’s approach to psychoanalysis and what 
Binswanger saw as Freud’s conceptualization of human beings as “an inhuman collection 
of causal mechanisms, instincts and formulae” (Cooper, 2003 citing Binswanger, 1963). 
He felt that this view of human beings was unnecessarily and inaccurately reductionist, in 
that it seemed to ignore their actual lived reality in favor of seeking out their inner causal 
mechanisms and component parts. Binswanger was also critical of what he saw as an 
attempt by Freud to separate humans from the world in which they lived, citing this as an 
example of the “subject-object divide” (Cooper, 2003, p. 35) that Binswanger and other 
existentialists found troubling and which, in their view, permeated much of Western 
psychological and psychoanalytical thinking of the time.  
Medard Boss, a Swiss psychiatrist who was Binswanger’s friend and colleague, 
worked with Binswanger on the development of Daseinsanalysis and eventually became 
the most prominent advocate for the application of Heidegger’s thought to 
psychotherapeutic practice. According to Boss—who, like Binswanger, was critical of 
many of Freud’s ideas—one aim of Daseinsanalysis was to engage in psychotherapeutic 
practice that paid attention to the genuine lived experience and the real, everyday lives of 
individuals, rather than trying to understand these individuals in terms of drives or 
instincts as in Freudian psychoanalysis  (Cooper, 2003).  
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Logotherapy. Victor Frankl (1959) developed his own form of existential 
psychotherapy that he called logotherapy, from the Greek, logos, which translates as 
“meaning.” In his development of logotherapy, he focused on the idea of there being a 
human impetus to find or create meaning, even in the face of meaninglessness (one of the 
four ultimate concerns of human existence mentioned earlier in this chapter). Frankl 
asserted that “man’s search for meaning is the primary motivation in his life and not a 
‘secondary rationalization’ of instinctual drives” (p. 121). This was, in part, Frankl’s way 
of stating his rejection of the idea that human beings’ desire for meaning in their lives is 
merely the product of the workings of drives and defense mechanisms taking place at a 
level beneath their conscious awareness (Frankl, 1959).  
Frankl (1959) often spoke of a “will to meaning” (p. 121) that he believed to be 
present in all human beings. When Frankl speaks of meaning, he is not referring to it in 
the sense of a grand, ultimate “meaning of life” that exists as a fixed, universal truth for 
all. What Frankl is talking about is meaning on an individual, personal level, “the specific 
meaning of a person’s life at a given moment” (p. 131). He believed that every individual 
had a unique task or vocation that only he or she could fulfill and thus he saw an 
individual’s attempt to find meaning in his or her life as something of a responsibility as 
well as a source of motivation (Frankl, 1959; 1967). Frankl (1967) has written that “one 
could define logotherapy by the literal translation as healing through meaning” (p. 140). 
As a therapeutic approach, the goal of logotherapy is not to give clients meaning 
in their lives, nor to tell them what it is that they should find meaningful. Instead, 
logotherapy aims to help clients discover for themselves meaning and purpose in their 
own lives and, by means of this discovery, overcome feelings of emptiness and despair 
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(Cooper, 2003). According to Frankl (1959), logotherapy focuses on the future rather 
than the past, being “less retrospective and less introspective” (p. 120) than Freudian 
psychoanalysis.  
Existential Psychotherapy in the United States. Rollo May (1958), an American 
existential psychotherapist, is identified as the person primarily responsible for 
introducing existential psychotherapy to the United States with the publication in 1958 of 
Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology. It was by means of the 
publication of this book that the writings of Binswanger and other European proponents 
of existential psychotherapy were brought to the United States and gained a wider 
audience (Cooper, 2003). The American tradition of existential therapy has tended to 
focus more on the individualistic aspect of existentialist philosophy than its recent 
European progenitors. In particular, it has emphasized the idea that human beings are 
capable of standing alone and directly confronting “the anxiety of existence” (Cooper, 
2003, p. 64).  
Irvin Yalom, an American existential psychotherapist and by some referred to—
along with most other American existential psychotherapists—as an “existential-
humanist psychotherapist” (Bugental & Bracke, 1992; Cooper, 2003), has contributed 
much to the field of existential psychotherapy in the United States, in particular by his 
many writings on the subject, including the 1980 publication of Existential 
Psychotherapy, which has since been frequently cited and is widely considered to be one 
of the most comprehensive and accessible books on the topic of existential 
psychotherapy. One aspect that Yalom has focused on in his writing and in his work as a 
therapist is the importance of paying attention to how clients are feeling in the present 
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moment—i.e., “in the ‘living moment’ of the therapeutic encounter” (Cooper, 2003, p. 
70)—and this is in keeping with the existentialist mode of thinking wherein the 
immediate, lived moment of the individual’s existence is the focus of attention.  
 
Key Concepts 
Existential Psychodynamics 
Yalom (1980) offers a concise definition of existential psychotherapy, describing 
it as “a dynamic approach to therapy which focuses on concerns that are rooted in the 
individual’s existence” (p. 5). Existential psychotherapy is considered to be a dynamic 
approach in that it holds that there are conscious and unconscious forces within each 
individual. These forces often conflict with one another, and “thought, emotion, and 
behavior, both adaptive and psychopathological, are the resultant of these conflicting 
forces” (Yalom, 1980, p. 6). What makes existential psychotherapy’s approach different 
from other dynamic approaches—Freud’s (1905) drive theory, to take one example—is 
its understanding of the nature of these internal forces and the conflicts that occur. From 
the existential psychotherapy perspective, internal conflicts arise not, as in Freudian 
psychodynamics, as the result of a struggle between id and superego, nor due to sexual or 
aggressive instincts. Instead, conflict arises as a result of an individual’s encounter with 
“the givens of existence. … [i.e.,] certain ultimate concerns” (Yalom, 1980, p. 8) of 
human life: death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness. In this framework the 
individual is viewed primarily as fearful and suffering rather than instinctually driven; the 
existential psychodynamic model begins with awareness and fear rather than instincts and 
drives (Yalom, 1980; May & Yalom, 2000).  
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Within the context of existential psychodynamics, there are also situations which 
individuals encounter that are referred to as boundary situations. These are unavoidable 
situations, inherent to human existence, “which cannot be dealt with by using the type of 
rational knowledge used to solve problems in everyday life” (Gordon, 1999, p. 227). 
According to Yalom (1980) a boundary situation is “a type of urgent experience that 
propels the individual into a confrontation with an existential situation” (p. 159). A 
boundary situation is seen as both a challenge and an opportunity. When faced with such 
a situation, one can respond with fear, anxiety, or despair, but one can also respond by 
gaining a greater sense of awareness and responsibility, and may choose to take an action 
that will lead to a sense of well-being and achievement.  
 
The “Ultimate Concerns” of Human Existence 
Death. Within the theoretical framework of existential psychotherapy, human 
beings’ confrontation with the idea of death, their understanding that they will one day 
cease to exist, plays a significant role in their lives. Death is seen as a “core existential 
conflict” (Yalom, 1980) that inevitably results in a certain amount of anxiety for every 
individual. The conflict arises as a result of one’s awareness of the inevitability of death 
juxtaposed with what most existential psychotherapists identify as human beings’ 
inherent wish to continue living indefinitely. “Man” is thus identified as a being who is 
constantly aware “that at some future moment he will not be; he is the being who is 
always in dialectical relation with non-being, death” (May, 1958, p. 42). This awareness 
of and confrontation with death is inevitably a source of anxiety (Tillich, 1952; Yalom, 
1980; May & Yalom, 2000) and, in the case of children, who normally become aware of 
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and concerned with the idea of death at a very early age, coming to terms with and 
accepting the idea of one’s eventual death—the knowledge that one will someday cease 
to exist—is considered to be one of the primary developmental tasks of childhood 
(Yalom, 1980, p. 76). Tillich (1952) saw the individual’s anxiety about death as 
something inherent in the human condition, as an unavoidable component of one’s 
existence and something that could not possibly be eliminated or avoided. 
Death is often referred to by existentialist thinkers as a primary example of a 
boundary situation. When an individual considers his or her own mortality and faces the 
reality that he or she will one day cease to exist, one possible reaction to this is a sense of 
dread or despair. However, it might just as well be the case that confronting the idea of 
one’s own finiteness and eventual death could serve to “awaken the urgency of living 
authentically without self-deception” (Gordon, 1999. p. 228) or shift “one away from 
trivial preoccupations and [provide] life with depth and poignancy and an entirely 
different perspective” (Yalom, 1980, p. 160). 
Freedom. From the perspective of existential psychotherapy, the concept of 
freedom has potentially frightening and disturbing implications. Whereas in most 
discussions, the word “freedom” or the idea of being “free” has only positive 
connotations, freedom carries additional weight and a deeper, more nuanced meaning as 
seen through the lens of existential psychotherapy. According to the existentialists, if 
humans are truly free, this implies that they are also utterly responsible and without any 
sort of guidance or assistance as they make their way in life. Existential psychotherapists 
hold that this freedom, and the responsibility that it implies, is often a source of great 
anxiety for many individuals. Further, they posit that human beings desire to have some 
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sort of guidance and structure in their lives. As Yalom (1980) has written, freedom, from 
an existential therapy perspective, “has a terrifying implication: it means that beneath us 
there is no ground—nothing, a void, an abyss (p. 8). In the context of existential 
psychodynamics, this concept of freedom, or groundlessness, can be a source of 
uncertainty and anxiety when juxtaposed with the innate human desire for ground, for 
some kind of structure or guidance.   
Isolation. Within the context of existential psychotherapy, the concept of isolation 
refers primarily to a particular type of isolation, namely existential isolation. Yalom 
(1980) describes three distinct types of isolation—all of which are likely to be 
encountered by psychotherapists during their work with clients—that every human being 
faces during the normal course of life. One of these is interpersonal isolation, which 
refers to an individual’s isolation and separation from other individuals. This type of 
isolation is generally experienced as loneliness. Another type of isolation, intrapersonal 
isolation refers to an individual’s isolation from him- or herself. This would include 
instances where an individual somehow stifles his or her own feelings, thoughts, or 
desires. It would also include situations in which part of an individual’s self has been 
partitioned off in some way, as in the case of a defense mechanism such as dissociation 
or repression.  The third type, and the one most germane to existential psychotherapy, is 
existential isolation, which refers to “an unbridgeable gulf between oneself and any other 
being. It refers … to an isolation even more fundamental—a separation between the 
individual and the world” (p. 355). This third type, existential isolation, is an intrinsic 
factor of human existence and persists regardless of how satisfied people are in their 
relationships with others or how self-aware and well-integrated they are with themselves. 
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Meaninglessness. From an existential perspective, an individual’s confrontation 
with meaninglessness arises due to the fact that human beings seek meaning and yet are 
adrift in a world without any set plan or direction for them to follow; their demand for 
some sort of meaning or larger purpose in the universe goes unheard and unanswered 
(Bauman & Waldo, 1998).  The idea of a “will to meaning” (Frankl, 1959, p. 121) and 
the utter importance of meaning for human life is a key aspect of existential 
psychodynamics. Yalom (1980) makes this point when he addresses the difficulty of 
confronting meaninglessness, writing that an “existential dynamic conflict stems from the 
dilemma of a meaning-seeking creature who is thrown into a universe that has no 
meaning” (p. 8). This is what Albert Camus, a French-Algerian writer and philosopher 
whose works often addressed existential themes, would have recognized as being 
reminiscent of his idea of the absurd—i.e., the situation that humans are faced with due to 
the fact that they seek and need meaning, all the while being confronted by a world that is 
meaningless and indifferent to this need (Camus, 1991). Existential philosophy 
acknowledges meaninglessness in the larger world and asserts that human beings can 
transcend it by creating meaning for themselves in their own immediate reality (Bauman 
& Waldo, 1998). Existential psychotherapists accept this concept of meaninglessness and 
attempt to put it into practice in their work with their patients, one goal of which is to 
help each patient to discover what it is that might lend a sense of meaning or purpose to 
his or her life. 
It may be worth pointing out that the type of meaning being referred to here—the 
meaning which Yalom, Camus, Frankl, and others speak of, and view as both valid and 
necessary—is the type of meaning that an individual may find within his or her own life. 
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Frankl (1959) writes that “this striving to find a meaning in one’s life is the primary 
motivational force in man” (p. 121) and yet “what matters is not the meaning of life in 
general, but rather the specific meaning of a person’s life at a given moment …. One 
should not search for an abstract meaning of life” (p. 131). The point here is that, from an 
existential psychotherapy perspective, while an individual may not be able to find 
meaning in “the world” or “the universe,” this does not mean that he or she must not 
attempt to live his or her life in a way that is meaningful on an individual, personal level. 
 
Psychopathology 
From the point of view of existential psychotherapy, many forms of 
psychopathology are understood largely in terms of individuals’ confrontation with the 
“givens of existence” (Yalom, 1980, p. 8)—i.e., the four ultimate concerns discussed 
above (death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness)—and are all seen as beginning 
with anxiety. Existential psychotherapists believe that a certain amount of existential 
anxiety is inevitable and must be faced by all human beings due to the fact that everyone 
confronts these ultimate concerns. Existential anxiety is further divided into two types—
normal anxiety and neurotic anxiety. When one’s anxiety seems reasonably proportional 
to the situation being faced—admittedly a subjective judgment in many cases—and does 
not require repression or the activation of defense mechanisms, it is referred to as normal 
anxiety. Anxiety at the normal level is also seen as a potentially constructive or creative 
force, in that it often leads individuals to seek and find a solution to the problem or 
situation being faced. When an individual fails to maintain their inevitable existential 
anxiety at a manageable level, it is then referred to as neurotic anxiety; this is the level 
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and type of anxiety at which psychopathology occurs. This type of anxiety differs from 
normal anxiety in that it is out of proportion with the situation being faced, often leads a 
person to resort to repression, and is destructive rather than constructive (May & Yalom, 
2000).  
Yalom (1980) and May and Yalom (2000) have written that psychopathology, to 
a significant extent, arises due to an individual’s inability to come to terms with the 
inevitability of his or her eventual and inevitable death. These authors assert that 
psychopathological symptoms as well as “maladaptive character structure have their 
origin in the individual terror of death” (May and Yalom, 2000, p. 284). Yalom (1980) 
asserts that those individuals who present as patients in clinical settings arrive there after 
having “been driven to extreme modes of defense” (p. 111) after failing to find other 
ways of coming to terms with their fear of death. It may be worth mentioning that, from 
an existential perspective, psychopathology is a matter of degree rather than kind; “the 
difference between normality and pathology is quantitative, not qualitative” (Yalom, 
1980, p. 13). This statement is made in recognition of the fact that each and every 
individual must at some point confront the inevitability of his or her eventual death, just 
as we all must face the other “ultimate concerns” of human existence. 
Frankl (1967), whose logotherapy holds meaning as its primary focus and 
concern, believed that all human beings have, as their primary need in life, a need for 
meaning and purpose. He saw psychopathology as the result of this “will to meaning” 
(Frankl, 1959, p. 121) being somehow frustrated or blocked. He described a type of 
problematic situation he referred to as an existential vacuum in which individuals 
experience existential frustration. Frankl referred to this existential vacuum as “the mass 
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neurosis of our age” (p. 140) and he believed that in “cases in which existential 
frustration produces neurotic symptoms, one is dealing with a new type of neurosis 
[which he called] ‘noogenic neurosis’” (p. 140). Frankl believed anxiety that rose to the 
level of neurosis could be avoided, but he, like other existential psychotherapists, 
acknowledged that a certain amount of existential anxiety was unavoidable. He believed 
that this was an inevitable fact of life and unique to human beings and, in particular, those 
living in the present age. Frankl believed that human beings, unlike animals, lacked 
instincts and drives that guided them in their lives, and he also felt that human beings in 
current times lacked belief in strict traditions and values that could govern them and tell 
them what to do in their lives. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the reader is presented with an analysis of SUDs using the two 
theoretical lenses that are the focus of this study—self psychology and existential 
therapy. The chapter begins by examining SUDs using two different models—deficit and 
conflict—to explain the etiology and nature of these disorders.  The chapter then 
reintroduces a number of key concepts from both theories that were previously 
introduced in Chapters III and IV, and discusses them here in the context of their 
relevance to understanding the nature of SUDs. There is also a discussion regarding the 
application of these key concepts from both theories in therapeutic treatment. The reader 
is then presented with each of the two theories’ views regarding individuals’ early 
development and its relevance to treatment. The chapter will also consider implications 
of this study and these two theoretical perspectives for clinical practice involving work 
with clients with SUDs.  
 
Deficit vs. Conflict 
Self Psychology: A Deficit Model 
From the point of view of self psychology, SUDs are the result of deficits—i.e., 
defects or weakness in the self. Kohut (1978) considered “addictive behavior” to be a 
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major symptom of narcissistic behavior disorders, which he believed were due to an 
underlying disorder involving “the break-up, enfeeblement or serious distortion of the 
self” (Kohut & Wolf, 1978, p. 416).  Kohut (1977) sees in the addicted individual “a 
central weakness … in the core of his personality [and] a defect in the self” (p. vii). In his 
view, substance abuse is an ill-fated attempt to alleviate the distress caused by this defect. 
Kohut saw ingestion of a drug as an attempt to fulfill needs that were not previously met 
as they should have been by an individual’s selfobjects. Goldstein (2001) describes the 
addicted individual as one who has an increased vulnerability to using substances because 
of a lack of proper internal self structures; substance use is an attempt to make up for this 
deficit.   
Khantzian’s (1985/1997) self-medication hypothesis (SMH)—which posits that 
addicts use substances in an attempt to self-medicate and find relief from their psychiatric 
problems and difficult emotions—strikes a similar tone to that of Kohut’s conception of 
the function of selfobjects. Khantzian, like Kohut, argues that the addicted individual 
turns to substances seeking a method of fulfilling certain functions—e.g., affect 
regulation, self-soothing, self-esteem—that the individual is unable to do for him- or 
herself. Khantzian believes that SUDs are the result of deficits—i.e., defects or weakness 
in the self—rather than intrapsychic conflict, and this too is in keeping with Kohut’s 
perspective. Weegman (2002) examines SUDs from a self psychology perspective and 
he, like Kohut and Khantzian, sees SUDs in terms of deficit rather than conflict. He 
argues that “extensive damage to the self” (p. 49) is present in some individuals long 
before they become addicted to drugs. He stresses the need for clinicians to appreciate the 
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continuous “tragic interaction” (p. 49) between the damage and the addiction, the result 
of which is a destructive and self-perpetuating spiral. 
Wurmser (1974) sees the use of drugs as an effort at self-treatment and he argues 
that drugs are employed as a means of defense against overwhelming affects and difficult 
emotions. Wurmser (1974) and Khantzian (1997) both believe that there is a significance 
to the particular substance that is selected by an individual—the “drug of choice”—since 
different substances have different effects, and addicts tend to settle on the particular 
substance(s) that help them cope with the specific affects and emotions that cause them 
the most difficulty. Again, this echoes Kohut’s view of substance use as an attempt to use 
drugs and alcohol as substitute selfobjects that can perform certain functions that these 
individuals are unable to perform for themselves.  
 
Existential Psychotherapy: A Conflict Model 
Existential psychotherapy, like self psychology, rejects Freud’s concept of human 
beings as creatures governed by instincts and drives. Both theories also share the view 
that SUDs are an outward, behavioral manifestation of an underlying problem. A key 
difference, however, is that while self psychology sees this problem in terms of deficit, 
existential psychotherapy sees it in terms of conflict. The nature of the conflict that 
existential writers describe involves the interaction between human beings’ needs/desires 
and the realities of existence—e.g., the wish to go on living and the knowledge that death 
is inevitable; the need for meaning in the face of meaninglessness; and the desire for 
guidance and structure in the face of freedom and groundlessness.  
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Theoretical Concepts 
Selfobjects 
While Kohut did not work primarily with addicted clients or deal with the issue of 
SUDs explicitly in much of his work, the ideas he developed regarding the nature of 
psychopathology in all its forms—one of which is addiction to drugs and/or alcohol—can 
be helpful when thinking about and working with clients with SUDs. Kohut’s conception 
of selfobjects and their functions is a good example of one such helpful idea. In self 
psychology, selfobjects are objects outside of the self “that give the self what it needs in 
order to become and remain energetic and cohesive” (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002, 
p. 181). As mentioned earlier, while selfobjects are usually people, they can also be 
“things,” common examples of which include various enriching and creative pursuits 
such as art, music, and literature. However, drugs and alcohol are also “things” that, for 
some, may serve selfobject functions.  
Kohut addressed the issue of addiction directly in one of his writings (1977), 
arguing that individuals who are addicted to drugs use drugs as substitutes for selfobjects 
that failed them traumatically at some point during their earlier psychological 
development. That is to say, something vital to the healthy development of a cohesive 
self was missing. According to Kohut, the drug-addicted individual, through use of the 
drug, is attempting to satisfy his or her unfulfilled selfobject needs. Thus the drug may 
serve as a mirroring selfobject that soothes and accepts, or as an idealized selfobject that 
allows merger and provides the self with a sense of power (Kohut, 1977). 
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Existential Psychodynamics 
From the point of view of existential psychotherapy, individuals who become 
addicted to drugs and alcohol often do so because of feelings of emptiness—a sort of 
existential vacuum—which causes a great deal of distress and unhappiness. These 
feelings of emptiness, when understood in the context of existential psychodynamics, are 
seen as resulting from an individual’s confrontation with the existential realities of life—
i.e., the “ultimate concerns” of human existence: death, freedom, meaninglessness, and 
isolation (Yalom, 1980). For individuals with SUDs, substance use is a means of seeking 
relief from difficult emotions and experiencing pleasure. However, due to the temporary 
nature of the effects of drugs and alcohol, the addicted individual becomes stuck in a self-
perpetuating cycle in which only temporary relief can be achieved. The real root of the 
individual’s problems—namely feelings of emptiness and a lack of meaning in his or her 
life—is thus never addressed, and so the cycle continues, without any lasting 
improvement or growth (Nicholson et al., 1994).  
Binswanger (1944/1958) describes addiction, which he referred to as 
toxicomania, as a case in which one sees a “striking case of universal existential craving 
to which the ‘decision-inhibited’ man falls prey” (p. 347). In his discussion of the 
experience of an addicted individual attempting to fulfill this existential craving, 
Binswanger describes a self-perpetuating cycle in which individuals attempt to fill the 
emptiness they feel and achieve enjoyment or pleasure by using drugs but then encounter 
shame and disappointment when they are struck by the unreality of their experience. Such 
negative feelings then compel these addicted individuals to repeat their substance use in 
yet another attempt to escape or feel something more positive (Binswanger, 1944/1958).  
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The Understimulated Self 
In his discussions of various psychopathological conditions, Kohut (1978) 
describes the understimulated self as a condition that comes about due to a lack of 
stimulating responsiveness from the child’s selfobjects. The result is an individual who 
lacks vitality and who is unable to feel a sense of excitement from within their own 
selves.  Thus, they must turn to external and artificial sources of stimulation in order to 
stave off a sense of inner lethargy and deadness. In children this can involve a variety of 
acting out behaviors, and in the case of adolescents and adults, drugs and alcohol provide 
them with an external means of altering their inner state and producing feelings of 
excitement. However, given the artificial and temporary nature of such methods, the 
individual who relies on substances to induce excitement is caught up in an up-and-down 
cycle of compulsive substance use during which no lasting change or strengthening of 
self-structure can occur. 
 
Transmuting Internalization 
Khantzian echoes in his writing much that can be found in the ideas of Kohut’s 
self psychology. Khantzian (2007) argues that individuals with SUDs suffer from certain 
developmental deficits resulting from their failure to internalize soothing, comforting, 
and validating aspects of attuned and empathic caregivers. This essentially parallels 
Kohut’s description of the process of transmuting internalization, whereby the self takes 
over functions previously performed by its selfobjects (e.g., soothing, affect regulation), 
thus reducing or eliminating the need for the selfobject (Goldstein, 2001). Transmuting 
internalization occurs through a process involving optimal mirroring, interaction, and 
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frustration between the self and its selfobjects. When successful, this process allows the 
developing self to reach a point where he or she is able to perform functions for which 
selfobjects had to be relied on previously (Elson, 1986). Referring back to Khantzian’s 
point, one result of the deficits that he notes regarding SUDs is that addicted individuals 
rely on drugs and alcohol to help them perform functions like self-soothing and affect 
regulation, since they were unable to internalize these functions through self-selfobject 
interactions during their earlier development. 
 
Narcissistic Crises 
Wurmser (1974) attributes the initiation of compulsive drug use in most cases to 
an acute narcissistic crisis, often occurring during adolescence and caused by events in 
which an individual experiences intense feelings of disappointment, either toward others 
or toward him- or herself. In such a crisis, the individual is overwhelmed with difficult 
feelings and is unable to cope without some kind of artificial defense. Such 
disappointments in the self and others seem reminiscent of Kohut’s ideas regarding the 
tripolar self and the selfobject needs of each the three poles.  
Looking at Wurmser’s statement regarding the occurrence of a narcissistic crisis 
from a self psychology perspective, one can view the “intense disappointments” about 
oneself as having a negative impact on the pole of the grandiose self—the pole that needs 
to feel admired, powerful, and special. Similarly, the intense disappointments felt toward 
others that Wurmser cites as a causal factor in narcissistic crises can be seen as having a 
negative impact on the tripolar self in more than one way. It may be that the 
disappointment is caused by a lack of proper mirroring, which is required by the 
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grandiose self. It may also be the case that the disappointment is more of an issue related 
to the pole of the idealized parent imago, which requires others whom the self can 
idealize and look up to and whom the self can rely on and merge with in order to feel 
safe.  
 
Boundary Situations 
The concept of boundary situations was discussed earlier in this paper, and I 
mention it again here because it seems to be a useful concept to consider when examining 
the issue of SUDs. In the context of existential psychodynamics, a boundary situation is 
“a type of urgent experience that propels the individual into a confrontation with an 
existential situation” (Yalom, 1980, p. 159). Such situations are seen as both a challenge 
and an opportunity; one can respond with fear, anxiety, or despair, but one can also 
respond by gaining a greater sense of awareness and responsibility, and may choose to 
take an action that will lead to a sense of well-being and achievement.  
This concept seems especially relevant to the experience of individuals with 
SUDs, since many of them have, throughout the history of their substance use, been 
brought closer to certain existential realities—e.g., death, isolation—than many other 
people. Looking at substance use and addiction as a type of boundary situation can be 
useful during treatment as a therapist attempts to understand the world and subjective 
experience of a client struggling with addiction. While individuals may begin using drugs 
and alcohol as a way of trying to manage difficulties involving a particular sort of 
boundary situation, it may also be just such an encounter with an “existential reality”—
e.g. health problems, an overdose, damaged relationships—that led to the client’s 
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decision to seek treatment in the first place. Thus it may be useful in helping the therapist 
to keep such a client engaged in treatment and hopeful about the potential for positive 
change in the future.  
 
Treatment 
Self Psychology 
As discussed earlier, Kohut stressed the importance of selfobject experiences and 
fulfilling relationships not only during early development but throughout one’s entire life. 
This lifelong need for selfobject experiences is an important and useful consideration for 
clinicians to be mindful of in their work with clients, since, from a self psychology 
perspective, treatment is an opportunity for repair and the provision of new selfobject 
experiences that may have been lacking earlier in clients’ lives. Therapy is seen as 
another chance for individuals to repair existing self-deficits—otherwise referred to by 
self psychologists as narcissistic vulnerability—and move forward in their development. 
It is an opportunity for clients to grow and strengthen their personality in ways that they 
were not able to do in the past.  
Self psychology is an approach to psychotherapy in which a great deal of 
emphasis is placed on the therapist’s use of empathy as the primary means of collecting 
data and engaging with the patient. Kohut often emphasized the critical role of empathy, 
which he referred to as vicarious introspection and defined as “the capacity to think and 
feel oneself into the inner life of another person” (Kohut, 1984, p. 82). Indeed, he 
believed that it was empathy—and empathy alone—that would make it possible for the 
therapist to engage with the patient. Kohut went so far as to label empathy as “the 
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operation that defines psychoanalysis” (Kohut, 1984, p. 175) and to assert that it would 
be impossible for a clinician to gain any real understanding of clients’ complex mental 
states and processes without the use of empathy. 
As mentioned previously, Kohut believed that all psychopathology—including 
SUDs—has as its source flaws in the self, all of which are due to disruptions in the 
relationship between self and selfobjects during childhood (Kohut, 1984). Given this 
understanding, self psychology approaches the treatment of SUDs as it would many other 
forms of psychopathology. However, Kohut (1959) has made some specific comments 
regarding the treatment of addicted clients, stating that during the process of therapy, the 
addicted client, in a way, becomes addicted to the therapist. Kohut believes that this is a 
normal part of the treatment process for individuals with SUDs; however, he points out 
that this is new addiction should not be confused with transference. In such cases, “the 
therapist is not a screen for the projection of existing psychological structure but a 
substitute for it” (p. 476). As a substitute for weak or missing aspects of the client’s 
psychological structure, the therapist is serving a similar purpose to that which the drug 
had been serving before the client entered treatment. What clients need in such cases are 
the continued empathy, soothing, and support of the therapist; given time and the ongoing 
engagement within the therapeutic relationship, the client will eventually be able to 
strengthen his or her own psychological structure and become less dependent on the 
therapist as a substitute. 
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Existential Psychotherapy 
With regard to treatment, existential therapists place emphasis on the importance 
of the therapist’s effort and ability to understand the client; all other concerns are 
considered to be less important. May (1983) believes that technique follows 
understanding and that being able to understand a client is in fact the “central task and 
responsibility” (p. 151) of the therapist. He argues that all other considerations, including 
one’s theoretical orientation or particular therapeutic method, are secondary to achieving 
this understanding. May acknowledges the wide range of therapeutic techniques that have 
been employed by various existential therapists. From an existential therapy perspective, 
the most important consideration regarding the use of one technique or another is the 
reason that it is being used and the purpose that it will serve in the work with a particular 
client at a particular time. As a theoretical framework, existential therapy is intended to 
provide therapists with a perspective that will help them to understand their clients’ world 
and subjective experience. As such, therapists are free to employ any technique in pursuit 
of such understanding and in order to encourage their clients’ growth and psychological 
well-being (Bauman & Waldo, 1998).  
In their work with addicted clients, it is important for clinicians to try to 
understand the role that drugs or alcohol played in these clients’ lives so as to appreciate 
the nature of the void that is inevitably created by the removal of these substances once 
the clients have stopped using drugs or alcohol. Once individuals with SUDs enter 
treatment and stop using drugs or alcohol, attention must be paid to the void that has been 
left, the needs that are no longer being fulfilled by means of the use and effects of 
substances. Meaning—on an individual, personal level—is an important, if not essential, 
 62 
focus of consideration for individuals in treatment for and seeking recovery from SUDs. 
Hull (1987) acknowledges this, arguing that individuals in recovery will be better able to 
manage stress and avoid relapse if they can develop a sense of meaning or purpose in 
their lives. This is in keeping with many of the ideas put forth by Frankl in his 
logotherapy-based approach to understanding psychopathology, wherein he argues that 
the problem of an “existential void”—a feeling of emptiness resulting form a lack of 
meaning or purpose in one’s life—is often the cause of emotional distress and 
psychopathology (Frankl, 1959). 
The importance of addressing clients’ need for some sort of meaning in their lives 
may be especially significant in the case of individuals with SUDs. Frankl (1967, as cited 
in Nicholson et al., 1994) has argued that individuals may develop SUDs because they 
lack meaning in their lives. If one views the problem of SUDs through the lens of 
Frankl’s logotherapy, one might view an individual’s addiction to drugs or alcohol as the 
result of a belief that his or her life is meaningless. Frankl believed that the search for a 
meaning or purpose in life—a “will to meaning” (Frankl, 1959, p. 121)—was an intrinsic 
part of being human. He argued that if this pursuit was somehow blocked, the result 
would be an existential vacuum in which an individual’s life would lose all meaning. In 
such cases the use of substances can be seen as an attempt to fill this existential vacuum 
(1967, as cited in Nicholson et al., 1994).  
It is not the intention of existential psychotherapists to eliminate all existential 
anxiety from their clients’ lives—even if such a feat were possible, they would not see it 
as desirable. Existential therapists believe that a normal amount of anxiety can actually 
be a constructive or creative force, in that it often leads individuals to seek and find a 
 63 
solution to the problem or situation being faced. However, when an individual fails to 
maintain their inevitable existential anxiety at a manageable level, it is then referred to as 
neurotic anxiety; this is the level and type of anxiety at which psychopathology occurs. 
This type of anxiety differs from normal anxiety in that it is out of proportion with the 
situation being faced, often leads a person to resort to repression, and is destructive rather 
than constructive (May & Yalom, 2000).  
In the end, existential psychotherapy takes a very respectful view of clients and 
their struggles, as clients’ difficulties are seen as the result of universal concerns and 
things which all individuals must deal with during the life course. As mentioned earlier, 
existential psychotherapists view psychopathology as a “matter of degree rather than 
kind” and as quantitative rather than qualitative—we all face these issues, but in the cases 
of certain individuals, coping skills fail and psychopathology results (Yalom, 1980).  
 
Development 
Self Psychology 
Because self psychologists view SUDs and other forms of psychopathology as the 
result of problems during early development, they focus a great deal of attention on 
learning about a client’s childhood and his or her self-selfobject relationships. The point 
of this is that self psychologists view therapy as an opportunity for repair and further 
development, so the present relationship in the therapeutic dyad is seen in part as a way 
of gaining insight into the nature of the disruptions and developmental failures that 
occurred earlier in the client’s life. This knowledge can then allow for greater 
understanding of a particular client’s needs and the nature of his or her deficits. During 
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therapy, self psychologists expect that selfobject transferences will occur in which the 
client reenacts frustrating early selfobject experiences “in the new, more empathic and 
non-judgmental context of treatment” (Goldstein, 2001, p. 111). Thus the therapist’s 
experiences with the client in the present therapeutic relationship help to provide a 
window into the client’s experiences and difficulties in the past. 
 
Existential Psychotherapy 
Existential psychotherapists place much less emphasis than do self psychologists 
on early development and its impact on the client in the present moment. It would not be 
true to say that early development is seen as unimportant; Yalom (1980) writes about the 
importance of the child’s developmental task of coming to terms with and accepting the 
idea of his or her eventual death, as well as the inevitable death of loved ones. However, 
developmental issues are considered to be much less relevant than what the client is 
feeling and experiencing in the here-and-now. The question of what, at the present 
moment, is the source of the client’s deepest fears and most intense anxiety, is not seen as 
one that can be answered by looking into the client’s earliest experiences. This is also an 
example of the different view that existential therapists have of words like “deep” and 
“fundamental” as compared with most other psychodynamic theories. Existential 
therapists do not see a justification for equating words like “deep” and “fundamental” 
with the idea of “earliest”—for them, “to explore deeply from an existential perspective 
does not mean that one explores the past; rather, it means that one brushes away everyday 
concerns and thinks deeply about one’s existential situation” (Yalom, 1980, p. 11). 
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Implications for Clinical Social Work Practice 
Despite the many differences that become apparent when looking at these two 
theories alongside one another, self psychology and existential psychotherapy share some 
important qualities that make them useful for clinical social workers and which are in 
keeping with the ethics and mission of the profession. Both of the theories that are 
examined in this study take a very optimistic view of the potential for clients to heal and 
improve their lives through treatment. While self psychology sees psychopathology in 
terms of deficit and past damage, it also places a great deal of emphasis on the potential 
for repair and future development through the new and supportive selfobject experiences 
that can occur during therapy. So, while self psychologists look to the past for sources of 
current defects and difficulties, they see selfobject needs and continued development as a 
lifelong process, so the opportunity for healing and growth is always present.  
Existential psychotherapists are also optimistic about the potential for healing and 
positive change, though they focus more on addressing a client’s immediate lived 
existence and place much less emphasis on working through problems originating in the 
past. From an existential psychotherapy perspective, therapists believe that they can work 
with clients to help them achieve new perspectives regarding their existential situation. 
Therapy is also seen as an opportunity to help clients understand that that all human 
beings face challenges and fears similar to theirs, whether it is the inevitability of death or 
the search for some kind of meaning in life. 
Both theories also focus on the importance of imperfect attunement and empathic 
failures between therapist and client during the course of therapy. For self psychologists, 
such occurrences are seen as being necessary to further development, since they provide 
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new opportunities for clients to work through past disruptions in their selfobject 
relationships and experience the process of transmuting internalization. Similarly, 
existential psychotherapists believe that it is important for clients to learn what they can 
and cannot get from relationships with others, so the client-therapist relationship is seen 
as an opportunity to model a deep but realistically imperfect relationship between two 
real people in the world. Existential therapists believe that clients’ experiences in their 
relationships with their therapists will help them in their other present and future 
relationships. 
Another area of overlap between the two theories that is relevant to clinical 
practice is their concern with the subjective experience of the client. In self psychology, 
this can be seen in Kohut’s and others’ focus on the importance of empathy as a 
therapeutic tool. Indeed, as mentioned previously, Kohut cited empathy as the therapist’s 
primary method of collecting data and engaging with the patient. Kohut referred to 
empathy as “vicarious introspection” and defined it as “the capacity to think and feel 
oneself into the inner life of another person” (Kohut, 1984, p. 82). Furthermore, Kohut 
asserted that it would be impossible for a clinician to gain any real understanding of 
clients’ complex mental states and processes without the use of empathy. While 
existential therapists do not write often about “empathy” as such, they do discuss, in a 
similar vein, the importance of understanding the client’s world and subjective 
experience. It would seem that whether or not one chooses to describe it in the same 
terms, self psychologists and existential psychotherapists would affirm May’s (1983) 
assertion that being able to understand a client is in fact the “central task and 
responsibility” (p. 151) of the therapist.  
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Conclusion 
The central guiding question of this theoretical thesis has been, “How can the 
theoretical lenses of self psychology and existential therapy help clinical social workers 
and other mental health professionals better understand substance use disorders (SUDs) 
and inform their work with addicted clients?” The two chosen theories were used 
together in order to better understand the nature of SUDs as well as the underlying 
psychological and existential factors that may contribute to the development and 
persistence of such disorders in certain individuals. It is hoped that further exploration of 
the compatibility of these two theoretical perspectives in the treatment of clients with 
SUDs can occur in the future. One area of potential focus in pursuit of this would be to 
collect data in the form of personal accounts from any clinicians who have relied on both 
of these theoretical lenses to inform their clinical work with their addicted clients. 
It is believed by this writer that both of these two theoretical lenses—separately 
and even more so together—can be useful to clinicians when thinking about treatment 
options in their work with clients with SUDs. As mentioned earlier, both of these 
theories, despite their many differences, share a number of important similarities that 
make them useful for clinical social work. These include an optimistic view of the 
potential for growth and healing through treatment; an emphasis on trying to understand 
the client’s subjective experience; and a genuinely humane and respectful view of all 
clients, including those struggling with SUDs.  
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